Romer v. Evans: Judicial Judgment or Emotive Utterance? by Kuligowski, Monte E.
Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development 
Volume 12 
Issue 1 Volume 12, Fall 1996, Issue 1 Article 16 
September 1996 
Romer v. Evans: Judicial Judgment or Emotive Utterance? 
Monte E. Kuligowski 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/jcred 
Recommended Citation 
Kuligowski, Monte E. (1996) "Romer v. Evans: Judicial Judgment or Emotive Utterance?," Journal of Civil 
Rights and Economic Development: Vol. 12 : Iss. 1 , Article 16. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/jcred/vol12/iss1/16 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development by an authorized editor of 
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
ROMER v. EVANS: JUDICIAL JUDGMENT
OR EMOTIVE UTTERANCE?
On May 20, 1996, the United States Supreme Court defeated
the will of the people of Colorado to amend the state's constitu-
tion.1 Colorado voters passed "Amendment 2" on November 3,
1992, by a vote of 813,966 to 710,151,2 effectively prohibiting Colo-
rado legislatures, agencies, and departments, at the local and
state levels, from enacting and enforcing laws and policies that
would protect homosexual orientation and conduct of its citizens.3
In its analysis, the Court found that there were no legitimate state
interests for Amendment 2 and accused the people of Colorado of
possessing a "bare desire" to harm a "politically unpopular
group."4 At first glance, the Court's ruling was a victory for the
gay rights lobby. However, lessons from the litigation and impli-
cations of the Court's opinion may prove serendipitous for future
Amendment 2-type initiatives.5
This Comment analyzes the judicial review of Amendment 2
and predicts the future of similar initiatives. Part One provides
background and reasons for the Colorado initiative. Part Two re-
views the Romer v. Evans decision of the United States Supreme
Court. Part Three provides reasons why the Court misinterpreted
Amendment 2. Finally, this comment explores lessons from the
I See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1627 (1996) (finding amendment to Colorado
Constitution violated principles of Fourteenth Amendment).
2 See Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1338 (Colo. 1994) (reporting voting results of
53.4% in favor of amendment).
3 See CoLo. CONST. art. II, § 2 (adopted Nov. 3, 1992). Amendment 2 provided:
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any of
its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt
or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or
bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise
be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority
status quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination. This Section of
the Constitution shall be in all respects self-executing.
Id.
4 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628 (discussing fact that laws such as Amendment 2 raise inevi-
table inference of animosity toward protected class) (quoting Department of Agric. v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
5 See, e.g., FIGHT THE RIGHT PROJECT, NATIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE POLICY
INSTITUTE, ANTI GAY INITIATIVEs UNDER CONSIDERATION 1 (1993). During the litigation of
Amendment 2, citizen organizations in at least eight other states began to promote similar
amendments: Arizona, California, Florida, Idaho, Michigan, Ohio, Oregon, and Washing-
ton. Id.
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litigation, together with precedent established and suggests the
decision will prove beneficial for future Amendment 2-type
initiatives.
I. ORIGIN OF AMENDMENT 2
Over the years, the gay rights lobby has become a powerful and
formidable political force.6 In 1975, gay rights activists sought to
pass a national gay rights bill, which lobbyists introduced repeat-
edly in Congress.7 Though Congress has been unwilling to extend
protected class status to gays and lesbians,8 at least eight states
have legislation that protects homosexuality.9 Since 1972, several
cities and counties have incorporated "sexual orientation" into
their civil rights statutes and ordinances, and at least 139 juris-
dictions have adopted some kind of protection for homosexuality. 10
In recent years, the gay rights movement made significant ad-
vancements in the state of Colorado. The cities of Denver, Boul-
der, and Aspen promoted protection of homosexuality over free-
6 Cf., e.g., Evans v. Romer, No. 92 CV 7223, 1993 WL 518586, at *12 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Dec.
14, 1993). "What was established to the satisfaction of this court is that gays and bisexuals
though small in number are skilled at building coalitions which is a key to political power."
Id.
7 See H. R. 423, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (attempting to enact legislation to protect
those of homosexual orientation).
8 See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia cited various con-
gressional acts specifically excluding homosexuality from the protection of federal civil
rights law. Id.; see also 140 CONG. REC. H2020-01, H2021 (1994). In March of 1994, during
proceedings of the 103d Congress, Congressman Hancock discussed the infusion of the gay
rights movement into society:
[Piro homosexual propaganda is actually infiltrating our public schools. Believe it or
not, right now in community after community, our children are being exposed to the
homosexual lifestyle .... That lifestyle is presented in an approving manner and as a
legitimate alternative lifestyle. This clearly defies the values of the overwhelming ma-
jority of parents and taxpayers throughout America. There are a host of programs and
groups, including project 10, since named project 21,... Mutual Caring, Mutual Shar-
ing, and others which teach young people homosexuality is normal, healthy, and desir-
able. Students . . . are referred to gay and lesbian community centers to meet and
interact with homosexual adults. Film strips, books, and other materials graphically
portray homosexual acts .... Some [centers] even have a buddy system to help match
up homosexual couples. Of course, traditional teachings against homosexuality are
systematically ridiculed as ignorance and bigotry. In New York City, even elementary
schools are exposed to pro homosexual propaganda, including two books entitled,
"Heather's Two Mommies," and "Daddy's Roommate." This is a clear effort to target
our young people.
Id.
9 See, e.g., Note, Constitutional Limits On Anti-Gay-Rights Initiatives, 106 HARv. L. REV.
1905, 1922 n.24 (1993) (identifying California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Min-
nesota, New Jersey, Vermont, and Wisconsin as states that have statutes providing vary-
ing degrees of protection to homosexuals).
10 See id. at 1908 (stating that different jurisdictions offer variety of protections).
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dom of association." Several ordinances required private
landlords and employers to accommodate self-avowed homosexu-
als, irrespective of individual convictions.' 2 Additionally, several
Colorado educational institutions had policies which protected
persons from discrimination based upon "sexual orientation."13
Denver's Mayor Wellington Webb employed a "gay and lesbian ad-
visory committee to monitor the interests of the same-sex commu-
nity statewide."' 4 In 1990, the governor of Colorado issued an Ex-
ecutive Order which prohibited "discrimination in any form" for
"sexual orientation" in state hiring and promotion.' 5 Finally, the
Colorado Civil Rights Commission proposed that the General As-
sembly add "sexual orientation" to the list of state law civil
rights.16
Due to the rise of the gay rights movement,' 7 Coloradans sought
"to preserve traditional sexual mores against the efforts of a politi-
cally powerful minority to revise those mores through use of the
11 See ASPEN MUN. CODE § 13-98 (1977) (prohibiting discrimination in housing situa-
tions); BOULDER REV. CODE §§ 12-1-1 to 12-1-11 (1987) (defining "sexual orientation" as "the
choice of sexual partners, i.e., bisexual, homosexual, or heterosexual"); DENVER MuN. CODE
art. IV, §§ 28-91 to 116 (1991) (regulating discrimination based on sexual orientation).
12 See ASPEN MUN. CODE § 13-98 (1977) (prohibiting discrimination in housing situa-
tions); BOULDER REV. CODE §§ 12-1-1 to 12-1-11 (1987) (defining "sexual orientation" as "the
choice of sexual partners, i.e., bisexual, homosexual, or heterosexual"); DENVER MUN. CODE
art. IV, §§ 28-91 to 116 (1991) (regulating discrimination based on sexual orientation); cf
Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1634 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting ordinances equated "moral disap-
proval of homosexual conduct with racial and religious bigotry"). See generally STEPHEN
BRANSFORD, GAY POLITICS VS. COLORADO 15 (1994) (discussing that gay rights ordinances,
including one in Jefferson County allowing school officials to encourage discussion of homo-
sexuality with eighth-graders, served as catalysts for gay rights movement).
13 See Brief for Respondent, Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996), available in 1995
WL 417786, at *5 [hereinafter Respondents' Brief] (discussing various policies in Colorado
institutions and agencies that prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation).
14 See Bransford, supra note 12, at 85 (discussing various movements in Colorado to
ensure equal treatment of its citizens, despite sexual orientation).
15 See Executive Order No. D0035 (Dec. 10, 1990) (prohibiting discrimination in state
hiring and promotion based on sexual orientation).
16 See Respondents' Brief, supra note 13, at 6-7. H.B. 1059, given the benign title, "The
Ethnic Harassment Bill," would have added "sexual orientation" to the list of Colorado's
civil rights classes, which include race, color, ancestry, religion, and national origin. Id.
Under the proposed law, harassment of homosexuals motivated by "bigotry," "bias," or evi-
dence of "prejudice" could have constituted a class 6 felony. Id.; BRANSFORD, supra note 12,
at 9-23. Numerous individuals, including two homemakers, initiated efforts to defeat H.B.
1059. Id.
17 See, e.g., Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1634 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Andrew M. Jacobs,
The Rhetorical Construction of Rights: The Case of the Gay Rights Movement, 1969-1991,
72 NEB. L. REV. 723, 724 (1993)). "[Homosexuals] possess political power much greater
than their numbers [suggest], both locally and statewide. Quite understandably, they
devote this political power to achieving not merely a grudging social toleration, but full
social acceptance." Id.
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laws." i" In 1991, a small grass roots effort to counter the advances
of the homosexual lobby emerged,19 challenging gay rights laws at
local and state levels. Organizers in Colorado Springs incorpo-
rated Colorado for Family Values (CFV), who drafted an initiative
for a state constitutional amendment. The rationale behind the
proposed amendment was a "conviction that... civil rights laws
were not intended to give protected status to sexual orientation."
and CFV's goal was to gather the necessary 49,279 signatures to
put the initiative on the November 1992 General Election Ballot
as a proposed constitutional amendment.2 °
The news media immediately challenged CFV's motives, 21 sug-
gesting that supporters of the amendment discriminated "against
innocent gays."22 The media did not frame its coverage to ade-
quately reflect how providing protected class status would impact
the citizens of Colorado and the nation.23 Despite opposition from
18 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629 (describing what Justice Scalia called "Kulturkampf").
19 See, e.g., BRANSFORD, supra note 12, at 9-35. The efforts to defeat H.B. 1059 and a
proposed gay rights ordinance in Colorado Springs began with only a handful of concerned
citizens posed against pro homosexual politicians and media coverage. Id.
20 See BRANSFORD, supra note 12, at 41. Colorado Attorney General, Gale Norton, said of
the amendment: "Properly analyzed, the guiding intent behind Amendment 2 was not to
deprive homosexuals... of any constitutionally guaranteed rights, but to remove any state-
based grounds for putting such individuals in a more favorable position vis-h-vis other citi-
zens than would be required under federal law." Id. at 101. During the process of selecting
the phraseology for the proposed amendment, the CFV committee fell into two camps. Id.
The first wanted the proposed amendment to reflect a moral and religious disapproval of
homosexuality. Id. The second wanted the amendment to be drafted and defended solely on
a civil rights basis, as reflected in the above quotations by CFV, the Attorney General, and
the amendment itself. Id. CFV ultimately decided to go with the second approach, believing
that voters would not sympathize with the wealthy gay rights lobby's drive to equate homo-
sexuality with racial and minority civil rights status. Id. The principal argument in promo-
tion of the initiative was the protection of freedom of speech and association over protected
class status of homosexuality. Id. at 39-40.
21 See id. at 36-41. Some CFV members strongly influenced the defeat of the pro homo-
sexual Ethnic Harassment Bill and had experienced the news media's attempts at casting
negative connotations by labeling opponents as the "religious right." Id. "A position against
gay rights automatically receives the religious right tag in the press." Id. at 229. Though
the proposed amendment was written solely in civil rights language, the media, neverthe-
less, applied religious labels to supporters (even though some supporters did not disap-
prove of private homosexuality, but of protective rights for homosexuality) and ironically,
the "more the news media turned up the heat, the more the demand grew for Amendment 2
petitions." Id. at 57.
22 See id. at 41 (noting that news stories portrayed those who supported initiative as
bigoted and hateful"). See generally Armstrong Letter Called 'Tragic, Hurtful, Painful', THE
DENVER POST, Mar. 22, 1992, at Al (referring to letter by former United States Senator for
Colorado, Bill Armstrong); Mental Dinosaurs Spewing Bigotry and Hate, THE DENVER
POST, Mar. 1, 1992, at Al (reporting on enactment of Amendment 2).
23 BRANsFoRD, supra note 12, at 41. The media "ignor[ed] the fact that gay rights laws in
Denver, Boulder, and Aspen had aggressed against freedoms of association, speech, and
moral expression for the heterosexual population." Id. at 93-94.
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a powerful lobby and the media,24 the voters of Colorado passed
Amendment 2.25
II. ROMERS v. EvAivs- THE DISPUTE BEHIND THE DECISION
A. Adjudication in the Colorado Courts
On November 12, 1992, Richard G. Evans and eight other indi-
viduals 26 filed suit in Colorado District Court in Denver to enjoin
the enforcement of Amendment 2. Plaintiffs claimed that the
amendment deprived them of their "First Amendment right of free
expression and their Fourteenth Amendment right to equal pro-
tection of the laws."27 The trial court reviewed the amendment as
if it involved a "fundamental right" to be free from "private bi-
24 See generally id. at 88-95.
IWhen it served the homosexual agenda to refer to themselves as "gay" rather than
homosexual, the [media complied]. When it served their agenda to use the term "sexual
preference," they got it. When sexual preference backfired, sounding as if they had
chosen the behavior, the pliable news rooms switched to "sexual orientation," sounding
like something that can't be helped.
Id. at 89; see also Mark Hartwig, A Content Analysis of Amendment 2 Coverage; Summary
of Results, CITIZEN MAGAZINE, July 1993, at 4. A post-election survey by Citizen Magazine
of 571 Colorado newspaper articles revealed that
Quotes supporting the amendment were printed only half as often as quotes against it.
Supporters making statements in favor of the amendment were outnumbered by those
against, six-to-one. Not one religious authority was cited supporting Amendment 2 in
the 571 articles. Nine religious authorities were cited opposing it. Forty-eight govern-
ment authorities were cited opposing Amendment 2, including the governor, most
mayors, city council members, and civil rights bureaucrats; only eleven government
officials were quoted as having anything positive to say about the amendment... and
these were not all sterling endorsements.
Id. (citations omitted).
25 See Evans v. Romer, No. 92-CV-7223, 1993 WL 19678, at *2 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Jan. 15,
1993). The Colorado trial court stated that:
Section 1 of Article II of the Bill of Rights sets out that all political power in Colorado is
vested in and derived from the people. Section 2 says the people of this state have the
sole and exclusive right of governing themselves as... a free sovereign and independ-
ent state. And to alter and abolish their Constitution and form of government when-
ever they may deem it necessary to their safety and happiness.
Id.; see also BRANSFORD, supra note 12, at 161. After the votes were tallied, 7,000 gay rights
supporters gathered at the state capitol. Id. Among the supporters were Governor Roy
Romer and the mayor of Denver. Id. "Romer hinted that the amendment might be found
unconstitutional. Mayor Webb told the crowd that he thought the amendment was invalid
in the city of Denver. The homosexual lobby applauded these elected heroes, and gay lead-
ers vowed a lawsuit and a boycott on the spot." Id.
26 See Respondents' Brief, supra note 13, at 1. The Boulder Valley School District, the
City and County of Denver, the City of Boulder, the City of Aspen, and the City Council of
Aspen were also included as plaintiffs. Id.
27 See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1273 (Colo. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 959, 959
(1993); see also Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1338 (Colo. 1994), cert. granted, 513 U.S.
1146, 1146 (1995).
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ases."28 The court concluded that Amendment 2 caused immediate
and irreparable harm to homosexuals and issued a preliminary
injunction. 29 The Defendants, Governor Roy Romer, Attorney
General Gale A. Norton, and the State of Colorado appealed. °
The Colorado Supreme Court, ignoring the lower court's identi-
fication of a fundamental right, instead, created one of its own.3
The court held that the amendment effectively "fence[d] out" an
"independently identifiable group" from the political process.32
Therefore, the court concluded that the amendment, with "reason-
able probability," infringed on a "fundamental right" to "partici-
pate equally in the political process,"33 violating the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. The court remanded the case for a-trial on the merits
employing a strict scrutiny standard of review.34
28 See Evans v. Romer, No. 92-CV-7223, 1993 WL 19678, at *11-12 (discussing alleged
fundamental right not to have private biases endorsed and addressing whether identifiable
class exists).
29 See id. at *12 (granting preliminary injunction, preventing enforcement of Amend-
ment 2).
30 See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1624 (1996). Although Governor Roy Romer was
named as a defendant in his gubernatorial capacity, he is on record as having opposed
Amendment 2. Id.
31 See id. (reviewing issue of fundamental right).
32 See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1281-82 (Colo. 1993) (discussing whether there
was infringement of fundamental right).
33 See id. at 1282-86. Such a "fundamental right" had never been identified by the
United States Supreme Court. Id. The Colorado Supreme Court presumed its new funda-
mental right from the value that the United States Supreme Court "placed on the ability of
individuals to participate in the political process." Id. at 1276 (emphasis added). Within the
spectrum of political participation, the Colorado Supreme Court extrapolated from the
United States Supreme Court's reapportionment, minority party rights and voting rights
cases, as well as "cases involving attempts to limit the ability of certain minority groups to
have desired legislation implemented through the normal political process." Id.
In his dissent, Judge Erickson noted that two new fundamental rights had been errone-
ously created by the Colorado courts. Id. at 1286 (Erickson, J., dissenting) (quotations omit-
ted). The first was based on an alleged fundamental right "not to have the State endorse
and give effect to private biases that affect an identifiable class." Id. That supposed right
"has never been identified or recognized by the United States Supreme Court or by any
other court." Id. at 1287. The second was an alleged fundamental right to "participate
equally in the political process." Id. The dissent pointed out that "at no point has the
Supreme Court explicitly identified the fundamental right that the majority extrapolates
from [the Court's voting rights and ballot access cases] on which it relies." Id. at 1294.
Moreover, it was urged that:
we need not analyze the assertion of the appellees that a preliminary injunction could
have been properly issued based on a fundamental right to participate equally in the
political process ... Neither the majority nor the appellees cite to any case where an
appellate court has upheld a preliminary injunction based on different legal grounds
than those articulated and relied on by the trial court.
Id.
34 See Evans, 854 P.2d at 1275. Although the Colorado courts created new fundamental
rights, they refused to classify homosexuality as a quasi-suspect or suspect class. Id.
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The trial court found that the state had "shown a compelling
interest for Amendment 2 to impinge fundamentally on the right
of homosexuals to participate equally in the political process."35 It
found two compelling interests: the promotion of religious free-
dom and the promotion of family privacy.36 The court, however,
granted a permanent injunction because Amendment 2 was not
"narrowly drawn to achieve the promotion of religious freedom in
the least restrictive manner possible."37 On appeal, the Colorado
Supreme Court did not find that the State's asserted interests
were compelling.38 The court, however, did recognize a substantial
interest in protecting public morality. 39 Thus, the court affirmed
the permanent injunction and barred the enforcement of Amend-
ment 2.40
B. The Majority: Amendment 2 Defies Conventional Inquiry
Upon granting certiorari,4 the issue before the United States
Supreme Court was whether interpretation of Amendment 2,
under the "authoritative construction" of Colorado's Supreme
35 BRANSFORD, supra note 12, at 203 (analyzing issue of whether fundamental right
exists).
36 Evans, 1993 WL 518586, at *9. The court found that the evidence presented was suffi-
cient for only two of the argued compelling interests. Id.
37 Id. At trial, Pastor Hasford Van of Boulder's Second Baptist Church testified about
possible implications of Boulder's "sexual orientation" ordinance involving employment of
homosexuals, in view of the fact that there is no religious exception under Boulder's ordi-
nance (the Aspen and Denver ordinances have exceptions for religious belief). Id. The court
held that Amendment 2 was not narrowly drawn to protect religious freedom: "The nar-
rowly focused way of addressing the Boulder ordinance is to add to it a religious exemption
such as is found in the Denver and Aspen ordinances." Id. But see Bob Jones Univ. v.
United States 461 U.S. 574, 574 (1983). A private school had a policy based upon religious
belief, which prohibited interracial dating among students. Id. The Court found that the
government had an overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education,
and therefore, despite the University's fundamental right to religious freedom, its tax-ex-
empt status was revoked. Id. at 603-604.
38 See Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1339-50 (Colo. 1993). The court considered the
following interests asserted at trial:
(1) deterring factionalism; (2) preserving the integrity of the state's political functions;
(3) preserving the ability of the state to remedy discrimination against suspect classes;
(4) preventing the government from interfering with personal, familial, and religious
privacy; (5) preventing government from subsidizing the political objectives of a special
interest group; and (6) promoting the physical and psychological well being of Colorado
children.
Id. at 1339. The state asserted an interest in "allowing the people themselves to establish
public social and moral norms." Id. at 1346.
39 See id. at 1347 (stating substantial interest is insufficient to impinge upon fundamen-
tal rights).
40 See id. at 1350 (affirming lower court's decision enforcing injunction).
41 See Romers v. Evans, 513 U.S. 1146, 1146 (1995).
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Court,4 2 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.4 3 The Court stated that equal protection of the laws
must coexist with "the practical necessity" that legislative classifi-
cation often disadvantages other groups or persons.4 4 The dispar-
ity may be reconciled by a judicial determination that the law bur-
dens a fundamental right, or targets a suspect class.45 The Court
will uphold the law absent such a finding, "so long as it bears a
rational relationship to a legitimate end."46 The Court found that
Amendment 2 did not burden a fundamental right or target a sus-
pect classy.4  Nevertheless, the Court found that the law did not
satisfy a "rational basis" standard of review.4"
The Court did not entertain either the question of suspect class
status of homosexuality or the state court's newly created "funda-
mental right" to participate equally in the political process and
consequently only one legitimate state interest was necessary to
uphold the amendment. 49 The State asserted interests in protect-
ing its citizens' freedom of association and, more specifically, the
liberties of landlords and employers with objections to homosexu-
ality.50 The defendants also cited an interest in conserving limited
42 See Romer, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1624 (1996) (stating Court was not relying on its own
interpretation of amendment "but upon the authoritative construction of Colorado's
Supreme Court").
43 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (providing equal protection of laws to all citizens).
44 See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627 (citing Personal Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442
U.S. 256, 271-72 (1979) & F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920))
(analyzing whether there was violation of equal protection).
45 See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627 (explaining concept of rational basis scrutiny under
Fourteenth Amendment).
46 Id. (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993) (discussing equal protection under
United States Constitution)).
47 See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1620-29. The Court found that Amendment 2 did not burden
a fundamental right. Id. With respect to the Colorado Supreme Court's new fundamental
right, the United States Supreme Court wasted no ink on the theory; it merely recounted
the lower court's creation of the alleged right, and then stated, "[wle ... affirm the judg-
ment, but on a rationale different from that adopted by the State Supreme Court." Id. But
see Evans v. Romers, 854 P.2d 1270, 1275 (Colo. 1993). The Colorado Supreme Court had
acknowledged that homosexuality does not constitute suspect classification status. Id.
48 See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627 (finding Amendment 2 "fails, indeed defies" rational
basis review).
49 See id. at 1624 (analyzing objectives of Amendment 2).
50 See Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1342 (Colo. 1994) (discussing state interest in
"protecting the sanctity of religious, familial, and personal privacy"); see also Romer, 116 S.
Ct. at 1629 (acknowledging state rationale for Amendment 2).
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resources to fight discrimination.5 ' The Court found that the scope
of the Amendment was too broad to address the state's interests.5 2
The Supreme Court stated that it relied on the "authoritative
construction" of the Colorado Supreme Court in interpreting
Amendment 2.13 The Court, however, failed to recognize as legiti-
mate the interest in protecting morality that the state court had
identified as substantial.5 4 The United States Supreme Court
found that the state court's construction ultimately prohibited any
governmental entity from adopting similar, or more protective,
sexual orientation legislation, absent an amendment to the state
constitution.5 5
The Court found that Amendment 2 prevented homosexuals
from seeking specific legal protection for discrimination and that
it forbid reinstatement of such laws.56 Moreover, "[hiomosexuals
are forbidden the safeguards that others enjoy or may seek with-
out constraint. They can obtain specific protection against dis-
crimination only by enlisting the citizenry of Colorado to amend
the state constitution."57 Homosexuals may not even seek protec-
tion from general laws under Amendment 2.'8 Finally, the Court
stated that Amendment 2 would void all existing anti-discrimina-
tion ordinances available to homosexuals. 59
The Court did not address the issue of freedom of association, as
Amendment 2 nullified legal protection for homosexuals "in pri-
51 See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629 (stating Amendment 2 violates Equal Protection Clause
by creating "classification of persons undertaken for its own sake").
52 See id. at 1620 (failing to comment on substantive state interest for protecting order
and morality). But see Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1347 (asserting substantial state
interests in protecting order and morality).
53 See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1624 (relying on interpretation of Colorado Supreme Court in
reviewing Amendment 2).
54 See id. at 1624. The Court's independent interpretation of Amendment 2 itself pre-
vented a substantive analysis of the state's asserted interests, which precluded even recog-
nition of a legitimate interest. Id. at 1629.
55 See id. at 1625 (rejecting Amendment 2 as too "sweeping and comprehensive") (quot-
ing Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1284-85 (Colo. 1993)). But see id. at 1630 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (noting that under Colorado Supreme Court's construction of amendment, only
burden to homosexuals is in promoting referendum to repeal Amendment 2).
56 See id. at 1625 (rejecting Amendment 2).
57 See id. at 1627 (finding only recourse is amendment of state constitution or trying to
pass helpful laws of general applicability).
58 See id. at 1626 (finding Amendment 2 prevents use of general laws).
59 See id. at 1626. (citing COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-4-106(7) (1988)). The Court stated that
"it was a fair, if not necessary, inference from the broad language of the amendment that it
deprives gays and lesbians even of the protection of general laws and policies that prohibit
arbitrary discrimination." Id.
1996]
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vate education and employment."6" At oral arguments, however,
Chief Justice Rehnquist illustrated the conflict between freedom
of association and protected class status of homosexuality, noting
"a private homeowner who wants to rent a room ... can decide to
take only Irishmen if [he] wants, but [he] cannot discriminate on
the basis of homosexuality."61 Nevertheless, any potential conflict
between freedom of association and protected class status of ho-
mosexuality became moot when the Court accepted that the Den-
ver, Boulder, and Aspen sexual orientation ordinances were gen-
erally applicable laws, protecting everyone. Amendment 2,
therefore, unfairly discriminated against homosexuals in the pri-
vate realm by denying them protection afforded to all other resi-
dents.62 The Court's interpretation of Amendment 2 mandated
one conclusion: "laws of the kind now before us raise the inevita-
ble inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity
toward the class of persons affected." 63 The Court held that the
amendment was motivated by nothing but "animus" and a "bare
desire to harm [a] politically unpopular group."64 Thus, Amend-
ment 2 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.65
It is submitted that the Court's independent interpretation of
Amendment 2 curtailed a conventional Fourteenth Amendment
60 Id. at 1629. The Court noted that the "primary rationale" for Amendment 2 was to
restore freedom of association for Colorado's citizens. Id.
61 Romer v. Evans, No. 94-1039, 1995 WL 605822, at *34 (U.S. Oral Arg. Oct 10, 1995)
(questioning plaintiffs' attorney on applicability of Amendment 2 to general laws).
62 See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628. The Court's reasoning allowed it to reject the State's
argument that Amendment 2 "puts gays and lesbians in the same position as all other
persons. [Tihe measure does no more than deny homosexuals special rights." Id. Rather
than finding that the amendment prevented favored status of homosexuality, the Court
found that homosexuals were singled out for "disfavored legal status," and "hardships." Id.
63 Id. (analyzing whether there is legitimate purpose to Amendment 2).
64 Id. at 1627, 1628 (citing Department of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
65 Id. Relying on another case involving a Fifth Amendment analysis, the Court found
the motives of the Colorado voters suspect: "If the adverse impact on the disfavored class is
an apparent aim of the legislature, its impartiality would be suspect." Id. at 1627-28 (quot-
ing United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 181 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)). Under the Court's reasoning, any disadvantages or burdens to homosexuals
under Amendment 2 would not reflect merely the "incidental" results which accompany all
legislation, but the very purpose and aim of the voters to disadvantage and burden homo-
sexuals. See id. at 1627-28 (citing Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256 (1979)). "Even laws enacted for broad and ambitious purposes often can be explained
by reference to legitimate public policies which justify the incidental disadvantages they
impose on certain persons." Id. at 1628. Nevertheless, when a law precludes a class of per-
sons from the protection of laws designed to protect the public at large, as the Court con-
cluded, the law itself prevents a traditional equal protection analysis and reveals a priori
that the motives behind the law were improper. Id.
ROMER v. EVANS
inquiry. While the Court found that the scope of Amendment 2
revealed improper motives of the Colorado voters, the Court over-
looked a relevant and critical inquiry. The Court failed to deter-
mine whether the state could disapprove of and discourage homo-
sexuality by denying protected class status to homosexuals.66
C. The Dissent: Amendment 2 Merely Denies Homosexuality
Protected Class Status
Proper reliance on the state court's interpretation of Amend-
ment 2 may have led the Supreme Court to find a legitimate state
interest.6 7 The Court, however, crafted a new constitutional doc-
trine, long on "emotive utterance" and short on "legal citation."68
As the dissent noted, the majority ignored an issue relevant to
Amendment 2's constitutionality.6 9 The dissent argued that the
majority wrongly attacked the Coloradans' motives, as Amend-
ment 2 merely expressed disapproval of homosexuality by denying
the class special protective status.7 °
The dissent found that the amendment prohibited "special
treatment of homosexuals, and nothing more."71 Amendment 2
did not preclude homosexuals from seeking protection from Colo-
rado's anti-discrimination laws, as all residents are protected
under general laws. 2 The dissent cited the Colorado Supreme
Court's construction of Amendment 2 that "Amendment 2 is not
intended to have any effect on [existing anti-discrimination] legis-
lation."73 Thus, homosexuals may seek special protection as mem-
r6 See Evans v. Romers, 882 P.2d 1335, 1347 (Colo. 1994) (stating substantial interest is
insufficient to impinge upon fundamental rights).
67 See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629 (relying upon Colorado Supreme Court's interpretation
of Amendment 2).
68 See id. at 1630 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (rejecting majority's acceptance of state interest
in protecting political process).
69 See id. at 1631 (finding state interest in political process not fundamental or relevant
to discussion).
70 See id. at 1630, 1633 (equating type of "animus" at issue as similar to disapproval of
criminal conduct or moral wrongs, such as polygamy); see also Stuart Taylor, Jr., Is Judi-
cial Restraint Dead?, N.J.L.J., Aug. 26, 1996, at 51 (discussing Justice Scalia's assertion
that Evans majority limited rights of Coloradans to self-government). See generally Kath-
leen M. Sullivan, Decisions Expand Equal Protection Rights, NAT'L L.J., July 29, 1996, at
C7 (analyzing Justice Scalia's "caustic dissent").
71 See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1630 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (finding that statute properly
prohibited special treatment for homosexuals); see also Sullivan, supra note 70, at C7 (dis-
cussing Scalia's dissent).
72 See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1630 (citing Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1346 (Colo.
1994)) (noting that homosexuals may still seek protection under general laws).
73 Id. at 1630 (quoting Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1346 (Colo. 1994)).
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bers of classes such as senior citizens or racial minorities. v4 The
dissent stated that "Itihe only denial of equal treatment [the ma-
jority] contends homosexuals have suffered is this: [t]hey may not
obtain preferential treatment without amending the state consti-
tution."75 The majority's characterization of the amendment's ef-
fect was "electoral-procedural discrimination," a doctrine yet un-
known to the Supreme Court.7 6 Showing that electoral-procedural
discrimination is jurisprudentially unsound, Justice Scalia wrote:
[C]onsider a state law prohibiting the award of municipal con-
tracts to relatives of mayors or city councilmen. Once such a
law is passed, the group composed of such relatives must, in
order to get the benefit of city contracts, persuade the state
legislature-unlike all other citizens, who need only persuade
the municipality. It is ridiculous to consider this a denial of
equal protection, which is why the Court's theory is unheard-
of.
7 7
Further, there is a rational basis for Amendment 2, validating
the law at enactment. As the dissent reasoned, the majority over-
[Ilt is significant to note that Colorado law currently proscribes discrimination against
persons who are not suspect classes, including discrimination based on age, § 24-34-
402(1)(a), 10A C.R.S. (1994 Supp.); marital or family status, § 24-34-502(1)(a), 10A
C.R.S. (1994 Supp.); veterans' status, § 28-3-506, 11B C.R.S. (1989); and for any legal,
off-duty conduct such as smoking tobacco, § 24-34-402.5, 10A C.R.S. (1994 Supp.). Of
course Amendment 2 is not intended to have any effect on this legislation.
Id. Moreover, Justice Scalia noted that:
The Court utterly fail[ed] to distinguish this portion of the Colorado court's opinion.
Colorado Rev. Stat. § 24-34-402.5 (Supp. 1994), which [the state court] authoritatively
declare[d] not to be affected by Amendment 2, was respondents' primary example of a
generally applicable law whose protections would be unavailable to homosexuals under
Amendment 2 .... This analysis [that Amendment 2 does not affect application of
general laws] . . . lays to rest such horribles ... as the prospect that assaults upon
homosexuals could not be prosecuted. The amendment prohibits special treatment of
homosexuals, and nothing more.
Id. "[Homosexuals] can obtain specific protection against discrimination only by enlisting
the citizenry of Colorado to amend the state constitution or perhaps, on the State's view, by
trying to pass helpful laws of general applicability." Id. at 1627.
74 See id. at 1633. Amendment 2 would not effect a "requirement of state law that pen-
sions be paid to all retiring state employees with a certain length of service; homosexual
employees, as well as others, would be entitled to that benefit. But it would prevent the
State or municipality from making death-benefit payments to the 'life partner' of a homo-
sexual . . . ." Id. at 1630.
75 Id. at 1630 (Scalia, J., dissenting). "[Tihe principle underlying the Court's opinion is
that one who is accorded equal protection under the laws, but cannot as readily as others
obtain preferential treatment under the laws, has been denied equal protection of the
laws." Id.
76 See id. at 1631 (explaining that "electoral-procedural discrimination" has been un-
heard of because laws that are valid in substance, as is Amendment 2, are valid at
enactment).
77 Id. (illustrating why Amendment 2 does not deny equal protection to homosexuals).
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looked Amendment 2's purpose and, consequently, its rational ba-
sis. Justice Scalia noted that the majority failed to even mention
Bowers v. Hardwick,"' a case most relevant to the issue before the
Court.79 The Bowers Court affirmed the constitutionality of state
laws that criminalize homosexual conduct."0 Thus, "it is constitu-
tionally permissible for a State to enact other laws merely disfa-
voring homosexual conduct. " " Moreover, the dissent explained,
"[i]fit is rational to criminalize the conduct, surely it is rational to
deny special favor and protection to those with a self-avowed ten-
dency or desire to engage in the conduct." 2
In addition, the majority "labor[ed] mightily"8 3 to circumvent
Davis v. Beason. 4 In Beason, the Court upheld the constitutional-
ity of an Idaho statute that denied polygamists the right to vote
and hold office.85 The Romer Court found that any reliance upon
Beason as authority for upholding Amendment 2 was misplaced.8 6
"To the extent [Beason] held that the groups designated in the
statute may be deprived of the right to vote because of their sta-
tus, its ruling could not stand without surviving strict scrutiny, a
most doubtful outcome."8 ' The dissent noted, however, that the
majority failed to mention that Beason did not involve an invidi-
ous statute; the Beason Court used strict scrutiny "because [the
Court] [had] declared the right to vote to be a 'fundamental polit-
78 478 U.S. at 186-96 (holding Georgia's sodomy statute did not violate fundamental
rights of homosexuals).
79 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1631 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Daniel Farber & Suzanna
Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST. CoMMiENT, 257, 263 (1996) (noting Justice Scalia's
opinion of amendments to laws held constitutional under Bowers); Marcia Coyle, Court:
"Animus' in Colorado Gay Law, NAT'L. L.J., June 3, 1996, at 2 (discussing failure of major-
ity in Romer v. Evans to discuss Bowers v. Hardwick).
80 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 186-96 (holding Georgia's sodomy statute constitutional).
81 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1631 (Scalia, J., dissenting). "[The Bowers] holding is unassaila-
ble, except by those who think that the Constitution changes to suit current fashions." Id.
82 Id. at 1632 (noting it is irrational to protect persons with tendency to engage in wrong-
ful conduct).
83 Id. at 1636 n.3 (criticizing distinction majority made between case at bar and Beason).
84 133 U.S. 333, 337 (1890) (finding bigamy and polygamy to be crimes that freedom of
religion could not overcome).
85 See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that polygamy can be
criminalized and those guilty can be deprived of right to vote); see also id. at 1636 (citing
Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 53, 94 (1974)) (distinguishing Murphy v. Ramsey and
Davis v. Beason as two cases where court approved exclusion of bigamists and polygamists
from franchise under territorial laws of Utah and Idaho).
86 See id. (holding reliance upon Beason was improper based on distinctions between
that case and case at bar).
87 Id. (citing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 337 (1972)) (asserting statute granting
right to vote to some citizens, but denying franchise to others, does not further any compel-
ling state interest and violates Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment).
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ical right'.""' Both Idaho and Colorado asserted the prevention of
social harm as rational bases for the enactment of their respective
statutes.8 9
The dissent concluded that the majority "employ[ed] a constitu-
tional theory heretofore unknown to frustrate Colorado's reason-
able effort to preserve traditional American moral values."90 The
Court accomplished that end "not only by inventing a novel and
extravagant constitutional doctrine to take the victory away from
traditional forces, but even by verbally disparaging as bigotry ad-
herence to traditional attitudes."91 The dissent ultimately as-
serted that the Court took sides in the "culture war," siding with
the political correctness of the gay rights movement.92 Unable to
discern a rational analysis from the majority's opinion, the dissent
concluded that the decision had "no foundation in American con-
stitutional law, and is an act, not of judicial judgment, but of polit-
ical will."93
III. MERE EMOTIVE UTTERANCE
A. Political and Media Influence on the Court's Decision
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia stated that "[t]he
Court's portrayal of Coloradans as a society fallen victim to point-
less, hate-filled 'gay-bashing' was so false as to be comical."94 The
Court's characterization of Amendment 2 reiterated the domineer-
88 Id. at 1636 n.3 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (finding fundamental right
was not at issue in Romer). But see Akhil R. Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer's
Rightness, 95 MIcH. L. REV. 203, 227 (1996) (labeling use of Davis v. Beason, "another off-
point case dredged up by the dissent").
89 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1636 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissent stated:
It remains to be explained how [the Idaho statute] was not an "impermissible target-
ing" of polygamists, but (the much more mild) Amendment 2 is an "impermissible
targeting" of homosexuals. Has the Court concluded that the perceived social harm of
polygamy is a "legitimate concern of the government," and the perceived social harm of
homosexuality is not?
Id.
90 Id. (arguing majority's holding that case could not survive strict scrutiny was frustra-
tion of attempt to preserve American values).
91 Id. at 1637 (finding majority purposefully thwarted efforts and improperly rejected
desire to preserve traditional concepts of morality).
92 See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing majority was taking sides in political debate
over gay rights); see also Sullivan, supra note 70, at C7 (discussing Justice Scalia's dissent).
93 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority has imper-
missibly taken sides in cultural debate); see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194
(1986) (asserting that Court approaches illegitimacy when pronouncing judge-made consti-
tutional law).
94 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1633 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (noting that Colo-
rado repealed anti-sodomy laws); see also Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 931 (4th Cir.
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ing views of the media and legal academia 9r who portrayed the
amendment as stripping homosexuals of their rights while depict-
ing voter motives as hateful and bigoted. 96 It is submitted that the
emotive rhetoric of the gay rights movement influenced the judici-
ary in its characterization of Amendment 2, and is largely respon-
sible for the Court's interpretation of the law.
B. Finding a Safe Harbor in Generally Applicable Laws
The majority broadly interpreted the amendment and assumed
that Amendment 2 precluded homosexuals from finding a safe
harbor in general laws. 9 8 The Court accurately found that Amend-
ment 2 repealed and rescinded Colorado's gay rights related provi-
sions.9 9 The Court's finding, however, that the law prohibited all
legislative, executive or judicial action in state or local govern-
ments to protect the class of homosexual persons was inaccu-
rate.10 0 Amendment 2 provides that:
1996) (holding that government actions against homosexual service members are not ille-
gitimate because they presume gays commit criminal misconduct).
95 See Note, Constitutional Limits On Anti-Gay-Rights Initiatives, 106 HARv. L. REv.
1905, 1908 (1993) (examining gay rights rhetoric and stating Amendment 2-type initiatives
unduly burden homosexuals' participation in political process).
96 See BRANSFORD, supra note 12, at 88-95. The gay rights hate rhetoric of the media and
legal academia, which sound judicial judgment once deflected, has now reduced constitu-
tional jurisprudence to "terminal silliness." Id. After voter passage of Amendment 2, gay
rights advocates labeled Colorado the "state of hate," and Colorado became the target of a
national boycott. Id. at 170-83.
97 See id. at 41. By drafting and defending the amendment on a civil rights basis, CFV
and the state had to assume that freedom of association would prevail over protection of
homosexuality. Id. But see Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Romer
majority gave no credence to CFV's assertion of the countervailing right to freedom of asso-
ciation. Id. The Court held that the broad denial of equal protection rights of homosexuals
is:
so far removed from particular justifications that we find it impossible to credit them.
We cannot say that Amendment 2 is directed to any identifiable legitimate purpose or
discreet objective. It is a status-based enactment divorced from any factual context
from which we could discern a relationship to legitimate state interest.
Id.
98 See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1626 (declaring explicit withdrawal of homosexuals from pro-
tected status may remove their immunity under general laws which prohibit arbitrary and
capricious discrimination). But see id. at 1630 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing singular re-
moval of one class of persons from Equal Protection Clause does not itself violate equal
protection).
99 See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1626; see also Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1284 (Colo.
1993). Colorado Executive Order D0035 (1990) which forbids employment discrimination
based on sexual orientation by the state would be rescinded if Amendment 2 were valid. Id.
Several provisions prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation at Colorado state
colleges would also be rescinded. Id.
100 See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1626. The Court stated that Amendment 2 imposed special
disability on homosexuals because it made them the only class of persons who could not
seek protection by petitioning Colorado state or local legislatures to enact laws to protect
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Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or
departments, nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions,
municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce
any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosex-
ual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or rela-
tionships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or enti-
tle any person or class of persons to have or claim any
minority status, quota preferences, protected status or claim
of discrimination. This Section of the Constitution shall be in
all respects self-executing. 1° 1
The first clause of the provision provides a standard to limit
civil rights classes. °2 The second clause revokes all remedies
based upon classifications in the first clause.' 0 3 Reading the sec-
ond clause separately from the first clause, the Court would have
been correct in finding that homosexuals would have no claim of
discrimination, even under generally applicable laws. Read in its
entirety, however, the amendment only precluded remedies where
homosexuality was the basis for a protective statute, regulation,
ordinance, or policy.10 4 As Justice Scalia noted in his dissent,
homosexuals obtain the same benefits that all persons have under
general laws, including favored status as the laws so delineate.1
0 5
Thus, Amendment 2 did not protect homosexual orientation or
homosexuality. Id. at 1625. But see id. at 1633-34 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia
suggested that moral and social disapprobation of homosexuality warrants abridgment of
protected class status of homosexuality. Id. The Court distinguished laws designed to pro-
tect homosexuals from laws designed to protect the general public. Id. at 1632. For exam-
ple, the Court noted that several government employees feared immediate discrimination if
the state were not enjoined from enforcing Amendment 2, since other general laws were
unable to prevent discrimination based on sexual orientation. Id.
101 COLO. CONST. art. II, § 2 (adopted Nov. 3, 1992) (emphasis added) (prohibiting enact-
ment, adoption or enforcement of statutes, regulations, ordinances or policies that give ho-
mosexual persons protected status based on sexual orientation).
102 See id. (prohibiting enactment, adoption or enforcement of statutes, regulations, ordi-
nances or policies that give homosexual persons special rights).
103 See id. (revoking all special claims granted to homosexuals, lesbians or bisexuals).
104 See id. (prohibiting sexual orientation to be basis for special protection under Colo-
rado laws).




conduct," °6 but did not prevent protection under generally applica-
ble laws.10 7
At oral argument, Chief Justice Rehnquist explored whether
homosexuals would be protected under general laws if the Court
upheld Amendment 2. He asked:
The [amendment] says, no agency shall adopt or enforce any
policy whereby homosexual conduct or ... orientation, shall
be the basis of any claim of discrimination. So if a police de-
partment says, there's been a lot of gay-bashing. It's our pol-
icy. Stop it. If the head librarian says, you're ... not letting
[gays] in. Stop it. If the health department says the same
thing, if the insurance commissioner says the same thing,
doesn't this word policy [prevent] that?'
The petitioners' enigmatic and inconsistent response may have
confused some members of the Court. For example, petitioners'
counsel inaccurately stated that the police department could have
such a policy, while the amendment would preclude a similar city
policy.' 0 9 The more sound interpretation, however, is that no pro-
tective policy under Amendment 2 could be based on homosexual-
ity. Application of general laws would have assuaged the Court's
concern over a denial of equal protection of the laws to homosexu-
als. Even with Amendment 2, homosexuals would have the same
access to the courts as others to assert violations of general laws;
homosexuality just could not be the basis for awarding judgment.
C. The Court's Decision Defies Conventional Inquiries
The Court also stated that, "Amendment 2 ... defies... conven-
tional inquiry."" 0 Consequently, the Court's opinion did not in-
106 See id. at 1633 (Scalia, J., dissenting). States may enact laws permitting discrimina-
tion in accordance with disapprobation of homosexuality, but the majority opinion improp-
erly equated moral disapproval of homosexual conduct with racial and religious bigotry.
Id.; see also Romer v. Evans, No. 94-1039, 1995 WL 605822, at *37 (U.S. Oral Arg. Oct. 10,
1995). Under the rule of prerogative, private individuals may discriminate for any reason,
except for status protected under civil rights ordinances and policies, such as race, national
origin and gender. Id. A private owner may deny someone because of the way he combs his
hair. Id. Under jurisdictions with gay rights ordinances, however, a private owner may not
deny someone because of his self-avowed homosexuality. Id.
107 See Posner, 1995 WL 605822, at *26-27 (debating whether Amendment 2 denied pro-
tection under generally applicable laws).
108 Id. at *27. Questioning counsel, Justice Renhquist was concerned about possible pro-
hibition of all policies that might protect homosexuals from facing discrimination. Id.
109 See id. at *29 (responding to inquiries from Justice Rehnquist at oral argument).
110 Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1627 (1996). The Court concluded that Amendment
2 defied conventional inquiry because it imposed such a broad and undifferentiated disabil-
19961
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volve a conventional equal protection analysis, but rather abstract
speculations on the breadth and effects of Amendment 2.111 The
Court did not conclude, however, that Amendment 2 was void of
state interests. Rather, the Court's broad interpretation of the
amendment nullified all potentially legitimate state interests, al-
lowing invalidation without ruling on any asserted interests.
1 2
Thus, the Court never addressed the essential issue of whether
the states may exclude homosexuality from protected status." 3
The dissent, though, expounded upon a substantial state inter-
est in protecting order and morality, concluding that states may
not only deny homosexuality protected class status, but disap-
prove of homosexuality to the point of criminalizing such con-
duct." 4 Review of that asserted interest was founded upon the
constitutional right of states to exercise their police power. The
dissent in Romer and the Colorado Supreme Court addressed the
morality interest, despite the fact that Amendment 2 was neither
drafted nor principally defended on a police power basis."' Both
opinions concluded that Colorado's enactment of Amendment 2
was a valid exercise of police power.
D. Lessons to Be Learned from the Litigation
The first lesson for states considering Amendment 2-type initia-
tives involves potential misinterpretation of laws. In retrospect,
ity on homosexuals and because that breadth is so discontinuous with the interests as-
serted by Colorado. Id. It further explained that this disqualification and exclusion from
the political process is unprecedented in American jurisprudence. Id.
111 Id. at 1629. The Court held that Amendment 2 does not bear any rational relation-
ship to any asserted state interests. Id.; see also id. at 1626. The Court noted the Amend-
ment was far removed from the state's interests in maintaining respect for freedom of asso-
ciation and conserving resources to fight other discrimination. Id. Maintenance of the
Amendment's broad language would preclude protection of homosexuals under general
laws and policies prohibiting arbitrary discrimination. Id. at 1628-29.
112 See id. at 1620-29. Because the Court was concerned solely with the amendment's
effects, the inquiry never reached a thorough evaluation of the state's asserted interests.
Id. But see Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1339 (Colo. 1994). At trial, the State asserted
six compelling interests.
113 See generally Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629 (failing to address whether homosexuals may
enjoy protected class status).
114 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 186-96 (1984) (holding Georgia's sodomy stat-
ute did not violate fundamental rights of homosexuals); Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1631 (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (finding fault with majority's failure to discuss Bowers holding); see also
Coyle, supra note 79, at 2 (discussing failure of majority to discuss Bowers case).
115 See Evans, 882 P.2d at 1356-57 (Erickson, J., dissenting) (arguing with majority's
reliance on fundamental right to participate in political process); see also Romer, 116 S. Ct.
at 1631-33 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (analogizing discrimination against homosexuals to dis-
crimination against polygamists). See generally Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. 104-199,
110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (expressing congressional disapproval of homosexual relations).
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the Colorado legislature should have phrased the initiative to ex-
plicitly preclude an overly-broad interpretation. Future initia-
tives to deny protected class status of homosexuality should pre-
cisely state such an objective, while expressly clarifying that the
measure will not deny any person the protections of general pro-
tective laws and remedies. Second, future laws should rely upon
the state's police power in denying protected status of homosexu-
ality."16 Only as a by-product of the states' police power may the
dissent's argument stand: If it is constitutional to criminalize ho-
mosexuality, surely it is within the states' power to disfavor it. 1 7
In light of the states' authority, confirmed in Bowers,'18 a state
that chooses not to criminalize homosexuality, does not relinquish
its right to deny homosexuality protected class status.
CONCLUSION
Influenced by the emotive rhetoric of the gay rights movement,
the Court struck down Amendment 2, accusing the Colorado vot-
ers of acting with animus and a bare desire to harm homosexuals.
Because the Court did not entertain the assertion that Amend-
116 See U.S. CONST. amends. IX & X. Under these amendments, all powers that are not
delegated to the federal government or prohibited by it to the states, are reserved for the
states and the people. Id. Included within that reserved power is the states' general "police
power," which is the states' power to protect the health, safety, morality and general wel-
fare of its residents. Id.; see also Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). "Public safety,
public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and order-these are some of the more con-
spicuous examples of the traditional application of the police power." Id.; Steverson v. City
of Vicksburg, 900 F. Supp. 1, 11 (S.D. Miss. 1994) (citing U.S. CONST. amend. X and Harper
v. Lindsay, 616 F.2d 849 (5th Cir. 1980)). "[Mlunicipalities have broad regulatory authority
over public health, welfare, and morals by virtue of their police powers." Id.; Loper v. New
York City Police Dep't, 766 F. Supp. 1280, 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (quoting Berman v. Parker,
348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954)). The Supreme Court has found that local government's police power
is broad and includes spiritual values. Id.; Evans, 882 P.2d at 1346 n.l,. With respect to
the State's failure to rely on its police power, there was some dispute about whether consid-
eration of morality arguments were properly before Colorado's high court. Id. "Plaintiffs
point out that in contrast to the ... interests addressed by the trial court, morality was not
listed in the state's disclosure certificate or the state's opening statement at trial as a sepa-
rate interest supporting Amendment 2." Id. The State responded, stating, "the issue of pub-
lic morality . . . permeates the discussion of compelling interests and indeed, can be re-
garded as a compelling interest in its own right." Id. The Colorado Supreme Court ruled
that the interest was properly before the court. Id. In its cursory consideration of public
morality, the court that actively crafted a "fundamental right," would not concede that pub-
lic morality was a compelling state interest. Id. at 1347. The court recognized that, "at the
most," the interest was substantial. Id. The court also noted that the state only cited one
authority in support of the morality interest. Id.
117 See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1632 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that discrimination
is permissible if disadvantaged class is defined by conduct which is constitutionally
criminalized).
118 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 186-96 (holding Georgia's sodomy statute did not violate funda-
mental rights of homosexuals).
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ment 2 burdened a fundamental right, only one legitimate state
interest was required to uphold the amendment. Nevertheless,
the Court disregarded the state court's "authoritative construc-
tion" of the amendment and pronounced its own interpretation.
The Court's overly-broad interpretation invalidated the amend-
ment and effectively foreclosed a substantive inquiry into the
state's asserted interests.
The Court's ruling essentially states that when a law targets an
identifiable class of persons for total preclusion from legal protec-
tion, the law is invalid. The analysis merely involved the implica-
tions of an overly-broad law. Interestingly, the legal questions
raised during litigation remain unchanged: Homosexual persons
were not added to the list of suspect classifications; Bowers v.
Hardwick remains good law, and; the passage of an initiative does
not burden a fundamental right to participate in the political
process.
Consequently, Amendment 2 would have passed constitutional
muster without the Court's independent interpretation. That con-
clusion is based upon the Court's subjecting the amendment only
to the rational basis standard of review.
Certainly, the Court's ruling was an initial defeat for Colorado
voters. The precedent establishing the standard of review, how-
ever, should prove beneficial for future initiatives that are
thoughtfully and precisely framed under the states' authority to
disapprove of homosexuality.
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